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Abstract 
Whilst the public funding of political parties is the norm in Western 
democracies, its comprehensive introduction has been resisted in Britain. 
Political and electoral arrangements in Britain require parties to function and 
campaign on a regular basis, whilst their income cycles largely on general 
elections. This article shows that the best predictor of party income is the 
necessity of a well-funded general election campaign rather than party 
performance. As a result, income can only be controlled by parties to a limited 
degree, which jeopardises their ability to determine their own financial 
position and fulfil their functions as political parties. 
 
The financing of political parties has been an increasingly important feature of British 
politics during the past fifteen years. Three major examinations of the system have taken 
place. The 1984 Trade Union Act challenged the basis of trade union political activity 
(Fisher, 1992). It required unions holding political funds to review this by regularly balloting 
their members. In both rounds of ballots to date (1985-6 and 1995-6), members supported the 
continuation of their union’s political funds. In 1993-4, the Home Affairs Select Committee 
investigated whether parties’ income were adequate for their needs and whether there was 
therefore a case for additional funds to made available by the state. The report concluded that 
the case for additional funds was not compelling. Finally, in 1998, the Committee on 
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Standards in Public Life (often known as the Neill Committee after its chair, Lord Neill) 
conducted a very extensive review of many aspects of British party finance. It made some 
one hundred proposals, which at the time of writing are under consideration.  
 
At present then, British party finance is based upon voluntary income. This form of funding 
relies on the principle that parties will raise money from members and supporters and underlies 
the notion that political parties are voluntary organisations and that support should be provided 
voluntarily. In short, those who support the party’s performance will fund parties. In this article, 
that assumption is tested with regards to parties’ economic performance.  
 
In addition to voluntary income, some state assistance is available. However, it is at a 
considerably lower level than in other democracies and much of it is concerned with electoral 
contests rather than the day to day running of parties. This is potentially problematic since, in 
addition to contesting regular elections at various levels, parties need to sustain political 
communication, recruitment and research, as well as their basic infrastructures. In short, they 
require a constant flow of income in order to fulfil their functions as political parties.  
 
This article first summarises overall trends in the income of the two main political parties and 
compares them with patterns of party finance in other comparable democracies.  
Subsequently, it examines the extent to which parties can determine the levels of income 
required to fulfil these functions by analysing the conditions under which parties receive 
more or less income.  
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Party Funding in Britain 
Since the last war, British political parties have tended to be financed in ways common to 
other democracies where comprehensive state funding has not been introduced 
(Heidenheimer, 1970, pp. 5-9; Paltiel, 1981, pp. 143-147; Ewing, 1992, pp. 6-7). Thus, in 
addition to monies received from their individual membership, the Labour Party has received 
income from trade union affiliations and donations and the Conservatives from corporate 
donations. However, in recent years, these patterns have been changing. In the Conservative 
Party, there have been three important developments in techniques of party fundraising which 
indicate something of a shift away from institutional sources of finance (Fisher, 1996b, 1997, 
1999). Firstly, in recent years there has been a re-emergence of personal donations to the 
Conservative Party to the extent that some individual donations have exceeded any made by a 
corporation (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1989, p.  210; Fisher, 1994a, 1997, 1999). Secondly, there 
has been a growth of other entrepreneurial forms of income, which are comprised largely of 
commercial activities such as financial services, conferences and sales. Thirdly, the 
proportion raised from constituency quota income has fallen considerably. This has been 
compounded by a continuing and projected fall in Conservative Party membership (Whiteley 
et al, 1994). 
 
In the Labour Party, trade unions contribute a significant proportion of Labour's finances and 
help fund the party in a number of ways, including affiliation payments, grants and ad hoc 
donations, sponsorship of candidates and MPs, advertisements in Labour Party publications, 
stands at Party conferences and a wide range of payments in kind including the provision of 
both resources and personnel. This variety of techniques is, in part, explained by the long 
term institutional links between the Labour Party and affiliated trade unions. However, 
Labour has been successful in recent years in diversifying its fundraising, though it has been 
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traditionally less successful in attracting large individual donations. Nevertheless, one of the 
most recent initiatives, the Labour Party Business Plan, has been largely financed by 
individual donations from members and supporters, or activities, such as high profile dinners, 
which attract money from individuals rather than institutions. In general, the Labour Party 
has been diversifying its income base and, whilst trade unions continue to play a very 
important role financially, Labour has been successful in harnessing significant income from 
individuals, either through donations, or through activities concerned with the Business Plan.  
 
Parties also benefit from the limited state assistance available in Britain. The earliest example 
of this was the introduction of the payment of MPs in 1911. Today, parties also receive free 
mailing and use of public halls at elections, while the larger parties get free broadcasting. 
Opposition parties additionally receive 'Short' money for their work in Parliament.
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might also add that parties have free state security provided at party conferences. This state 
assistance is modest in comparison with other Western democracies where the public funding 
of political parties is the norm (Nassmacher, 1993, p. 234). Parties in Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Norway and Sweden all receive assistance at 
least at national level and often at local and regional level as well (Nassmacher, 1993, pp. 
241-244). 
 
The introduction of state subsidies in many nations partly reflects concerns that political parties 
are facing decline in terms of strength and resources. This, in turn, makes them less able to 
perform the role of intermediary between the citizenry and the state (Nassmacher, 1993, p. 234; 
Pierre & Svåsand, 1992, p. 2). There has also been a fear that the practice of voluntary donations 
can, and does, lead to corruption (Nassmacher, 1993; Pierre & Svåsand, 1992; Gidlund, 1991). 
The view has been that private contributions by either individuals or groups have undesirable 
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effects in the forms of preferential treatment of contributors. State funding is designed to limit or 
eliminate the potential for such practices.  
 
The effects of state funding have varied. Certainly, its introduction has not succeeded in wholly 
eliminating corruption and loophole-seeking within the sphere of political finance. Nevertheless, 
comparative studies have shown there to be some common trends (Gidlund, 1991, p. 184; 
Nassmacher, 1989). Firstly, parties have obtained more resources, though costs have increased to 
a corresponding degree. Secondly, dependency by the parties on public money has been high. 
Thirdly, there has been a general growth in bureaucratisation and professionalisation in party 
organisations. Fourthly, state funding has contributed to the general trend of centralisation 
amongst parties. Fifthly, the importance of party memberships has declined, as has the 
dependence upon voluntary donations, although these have in some cases continued despite state 
funding (Gidlund, 1991; Drysch, 1993, p. 165; Klee, 1993, p. 193; Ciaurro, 1989, pp. 161-162). 
Sixth, there has been a large growth in indirect public grants to parties; an increase in party 
activities and a greater ability to maintain activities between elections. 
 
In Britain, there have been strong reservations about the introduction of state funding. Firstly, it 
is argued that members would no longer be sought by parties and that the party system would 
become rigid. Certainly, the removal of the need to raise voluntary contributions has led to a loss 
in the incentive to recruit members in some cases (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981, p. 8-10; Alexander, 
1989, p. 17). Nevertheless, it could be argued that, in Britain where extensive state funding does 
not exist, party membership has been in broad and continual decline. Secondly, the fear that state 
funding would institutionalise present party systems, thus not permitting new party entry, has not 
proved correct (Gidlund, 1991, pp. 184-185; Nassmacher, 1989). Parties are often required to 
gain thresholds of electoral support in order to qualify for state funds and, as Nassmacher points 
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out, the effect of state funding on the entry of new parties: ‘is rather a question of 
thresholds...than of principle.’ (Nassmacher, 1989, pp. 248-249). Moreover, there is little 
evidence that voluntary systems of party funding are any less rigid (Fisher, 2000). 
 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument is one of principle rather than impact. It is suggested that, 
if a political party cannot survive financially, it is not the place of the state to intervene and 
maintain an organisation that cannot collect sufficient funds from its supporters (Home Affairs 
Committee, 1994, pp. xvii-xviii). This becomes particularly pertinent when one considers that 
public opinion has rarely been enthusiastic about the indispensable role of political parties (Pierre 
& Svåsand, 1992, p. 12).  
 
The report of the Neill Committee did not explicitly support an extension of public funding to 
political parties. However, it made a number of proposals which, if implemented, would point to 
an acceptance of the principle of increased public funding. Firstly, a Policy Development Fund 
will be established, initially cash limited to £2 million per annum, to assist parties to engage 
more fully on policy development. Secondly, it was proposed that the provision of ‘Short’ money 
be increased threefold. This proposal has now been approved by Parliament, although the 
increase agreed was a factor of 2.7 (HM Government, 1999, p. 34). Finally, the Neill Committee 
proposed that tax relief be provided for donations of up to £500. This would have resulted in 
some state funding by virtue of monies that would normally go to the Treasury. However, at this 
stage, this is one of the few proposals that the Government has rejected (HM Government, 1999, 
p. 33). If these proposals are implemented, there will, in effect, be an extension of public funding 
of parties. Moreover, given the Report’s views that parties are fundamental to parliamentary 
democracy, that they should be able to function adequately and that the importance of parties 
goes beyond contesting elections, there is the possibility of further state aid should parties find 
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themselves in financial difficulty. Given that parties face increasing campaign costs in uncertain 
electoral arrangements, further state aid may become a practical necessity. 
 
A Funding Cycle 
In the meantime, the absence of regular state assistance to parties has had the effect of 
producing a funding cycle based around the electoral cycle of British general elections (see 
Figures 1 and 2).
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 This occurs despite the fact that both parties, although especially Labour, 
have a certain amount of ‘routine’ voluntary payments (see Figures 3 and 4 and Fisher, 
2000). In the case of the Labour Party, trade union affiliations payments are regular and 
rarely seriously questioned by the trade unions (Fisher, 1995). In the case of the Conservative 
Party, whilst the level of donations does fluctuate, it still forms a relatively consistent 
proportion of party income. However, this funding cycle leads to two principal problems for 
parties. Firstly, most expenditure for British political parties is routine,
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constituting around 80% of both Conservative and Labour central expenditure (Fisher, 2000). 
Thus, in order simply to maintain themselves as viable organisations, parties require some 
consistent financial input. This is an important point since, if greater measures of state 
funding were to be introduced, they would clearly not only be spent upon advertising (which 
might generate negative views about state assistance
5
) but also on maintaining the parties 
more broadly (Fisher, 1995, p.194, 1996a, pp.  200-201).  
 
Secondly, the notion of an electoral cycle every four to five years in British politics is 
something of a misnomer, at least as far as parties are concerned. Whilst parties do 
concentrate most resources and interest upon general elections, they also campaign on a 
national basis in European elections (every five years) and across large proportions of the 
country in the various staggered local elections. Moreover, it is worth noting that in recent 
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years, local government campaigns have been fought in a far more ‘national’ way (Fisher, 
2000). Moreover, with the advent of new parliaments and assemblies in Scotland, Wales and 
London, parties are now campaigning even more frequently. 
 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
[Figure 3 About Here] 
[Figure 4 About Here] 
 
The result is that, whilst voluntary funds tend to be cyclical, party expenditures are much less 
so. As a result, parties find themselves routinely in deficit, not necessarily by excessive 
campaign spending at general elections, but through simply trying to operate upon a routine 
basis. An examination of party expenditure as a proportion of income over time reveals this 
problem (see Figures 5 and 6) which is greater for the Conservatives than for Labour. This is 
partly due to the greater element of routine funding that Labour receives from the trade 
unions, but is also a reflection of trade union traditions of ‘good housekeeping’ (Minkin, 
1991, p. 512).  
 
[Figure 5 About Here] 
[Figure 6 About Here] 
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Predictors of Party Income 
Levels of party income clearly fluctuate quite considerably. Preliminary visual analysis of 
Figures 1 to 4 provides suggestive evidence regarding the cause of such fluctuations, namely 
the timing of general elections. However, our understanding of the determinants of party 
income requires more vigorous multivariate analysis. In this section of the article, a number 
of aggregate indicators are used in an attempt to predict levels of income. In this way, one 
can assess and estimate under what conditions a party will be well or poorly funded. 
Moreover, one can assess to what extent parties may have any real control over these factors. 
Five models are employed. The models are of two types: market models and non-market 
models. The first three models are market-based models and are designed to test whether a 
market for party income exists in the same way that it could be said to do so for votes (Clarke 
& Whiteley, 1990; Clarke & Stewart, 1995; Sanders, 1992, 1996; Sanders, Ward & Marsh, 
1987). Such models work on the logic of punishment and reward. Thus, successful 
government performance in the economy is rewarded by continued electoral support. By way 
of contrast, failure results in a withdrawal of electoral support. The same logic applies to 
parties’ voluntary income. Parties that deliver the economic ‘goods’ should benefit 
financially, whilst those that do not, should suffer a decline in their income.  
 
Such market based models may also apply to opposition parties since Downsian theory 
argues that the credibility of alternative governments is also critical, particularly when 
ideological distance between parties is perceived to be so narrow as to render a voter unable 
to make a choice (Downs, 1957, pp. 41-45; Laver, 1997, pp. 99-100). Thus, just as potential 
electors will evaluate the alternative government to estimate its putative improved 
performance as compared with the incumbent, so contributors will also behave in this way.  
Subjective economic evaluations are also examined. This recognises the fact that subjective 
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evaluations and objective states of affairs may not wholly correlate. Again, this is a market-
based model whereby subjective satisfaction should result in parties being rewarded or 
punished financially.  
 
These market-based models have their roots in forms of democratic theory, which suggest 
that elections are a means to evaluate the performance of parties, both retrospectively and 
prospectively, and make choices accordingly. In these models, borrowed from studies of 
voting behaviour, electoral support is simply substituted with financial support.  It should be 
noted, however, that electoral support and financial support are not identical forms of 
participation. Competition for votes assumes equal voting rights. Competition for funds, 
however, is beset by the difficulty that wealth is unevenly distributed. Indeed, some argue 
that inequalities in money are greater than any other inequalities of the resources that affect 
political life, because money can buy virtually all of the resources that are provided by 
citizens (Paltiel, 1981; Adamany & Agree, 1975). Notwithstanding this caveat, if these 
models indicate that a market exists for party donations, then the case for more 
comprehensive state funding is weakened. In theory, parties would be able to enhance their 
level of voluntary income, either through good economic performance as incumbents, or 
through providing credible alternatives in opposition. 
 
It might be argued, however, that there is an asymmetry implicit in such ‘market’ models; 
namely that, in some respects, the Conservative and Labour Parties are not competing on the 
same terms in such a market for donations. Certainly, corporate donations are most likely to 
be made to the Conservative Party (Fisher, 1994b) and, notwithstanding Labour’s increasing 
success in this area (Fisher, 1997), that pattern broadly remains. Nevertheless, whilst the 
market is not identical, the principle remains. Donations by individual members to their 
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parties may vary depending upon economic performance and trade unions do not confine 
their payments to the Labour Party as routine affiliation. Rather, they make ad hoc donations 
which, in theory, may reflect satisfaction or otherwise with the incumbent party’s 
performance. In short, whilst the Conservatives might be said to have a larger potential 
market, since relatively few companies make donations (Fisher, 1994b), the Labour Party’s 
non-affiliation income is clearly variable. Moreover, the willingness of individuals and 
organisations to take part in parties’ entrepreneurial fundraising may also be said to be 
affected by such market-based models. 
 
The case against treating parties as competitors for voluntary income is examined in the 
second group of non-market based models of party income. Under these models, which 
examine overall levels of disposable income and the timing of general elections, parties are 
expected to benefit either when contributors have more money or when elections are called. 
In these models, there are no parties to reward or punish and, therefore, parties have little 
control over their levels of voluntary income. Thus, they may be rewarded or punished, 
regardless of how they perform economically. If these models are successful, the case for 
more comprehensive state funding is strengthened in the first case because a party’s 
supporters may be more likely to reward it financially when they have more disposable 
income, regardless of which party has presided over this rise. In the second model, parties 
cannot be rewarded or punished simply by the timing of an election. The models are 
described in more detail below and, overall, their use presents an attempt to evaluate the 
effectiveness of voluntary party income in Britain. The case for or against increased public 
provision is therefore evaluated empirically rather than normatively.  
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Model 1 - The Punishment-Reward Model  
This model utilises objective economic indicators. The basis of variable choice is twofold. 
First, indicators have been selected where they are commonly used to evaluate economic 
success (i.e. Balance of Payments, inflation). Secondly, indicators identified by donors 
themselves as being ones of importance are utilised (Fisher, 1994c). The model hypothesises 
that economic success by incumbents will be rewarded with increased party income and 
economic failure will be punished by a decrease.  
 
Model 2 - The Expectation-Satisfaction Model 
This model applies to opposition parties and essentially runs Model 1 in reverse. It 
hypothesises that when the incumbent party is experiencing economic difficulties, the level 
of income to opposition parties will rise. There is an expectation that an alternative 
government will produce more favourable economic conditions. By contrast, when 
incumbent parties experience good economic fortunes, levels of income to opposition parties 
will fall. There is satisfaction with existing government performance. 
 
Model 3 - The Evaluation Model 
This model utilises individual and corporate indicators of economic confidence. It is run 
separately from the previous models as the individual time series only begins in 1974. It 
predicts that economic evaluations will have an effect upon both incumbent and opposition 
income in a similar way to Models 1 and 2. Thus, increases in economic optimism and 
business confidence will result in financial benefits for the incumbent and any decline will 
result in a withdrawal of funds. Conversely, increases in public economic confidence should 
result in reduced income for the opposition while any decline in should result in financial 
benefits for that party.  
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Model 4 - The Disposable Income Model 
This model hypothesises that changes in disposable income will subsequently be reflected in 
parties’ income. Variables affecting levels of disposable income include bank rates, inflation 
as well as an index of change in personal disposable income. It hypothesises that, when these 
variables improve, both parties’ income will rise and vice versa. This is a trend that has been 
identified in the USA (Heard, 1960, p.75) and may take place under any government. It is, 
therefore, a non-market model. 
 
Model 5 - The Electoral Necessity Model 
This model hypothesises that levels of party income will reflect the timing of general 
elections and the marginality of electoral competition. Thus, party income will rise at the 
time of elections, especially when the electoral race is relatively close. The logic of this is 
that parties will require more money in a close electoral race and that contributors will feel 
more inclined to participate when there is greater marginality. This is a trend identified in 
studies of American contributions (Heard, 1960, p.75) as well as more broadly in British 
voter turnout (Denver, 1997). 
 
Methodology 
Data for these analyses are annual observations of the variables involved. This restriction is 
caused by the availability of party income data, which are produced in yearly accounts. As a 
result, there is no way of ascertaining whether certain periods of the year generate more 
income than others, for example. Where higher frequency data have been used, these have 
been annualised by averaging or aggregating over the year as appropriate. In view of the 
rather low frequency of observation, there is no need to build lags into the models as the 
period of one year provides a sufficient internal lag.  
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The following aggregate variables are used in these analyses: Conservative central income in 
real terms (standardised by the RPI); Labour central income in real terms (standardised by the 
RPI); highest bank rate in calendar year; Balance of Payments (current account); Export-
Import ratio; Growth based on GDP output; annual rate of inflation; percentage change from 
previous year in the maximum unemployment level; Terms of Trade index (Export Price 
Index as a percentage of Import Price Index); CBI Industrial Trends survey - an indicator of 
business confidence; prospective egocentric economic evaluations; prospective sociotropic 
economic evaluations; retrospective egocentric economic evaluations; retrospective 
sociotropic economic evaluations; percentage change from previous year in the Personal 
Disposable Income index; general election year (dummy variable - Yes=1 No=0); absolute 
levels of difference between mean party poll ratings (marginality) and pre-general election 
year (dummy variable - Yes=1 No=0).
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The use of these time-series data presents three methodological issues that need to be 
addressed. First, before conventional regression analyses are undertaken, one needs to 
establish whether the variables are stationary. The use of nonstationary variables, that is those 
that do not fluctuate around a constant mean, can produce spurious findings in regression 
analyses. This is because in time-series analyses, theoretically unrelated variables can appear 
to be related because they grow (or decline) in a similar way (Clarke, Stewart & Whiteley, 
1997, p.148). A common procedure for testing nonstationarity is the Dickey-Fuller test. The 
most common method of performing this test is as follows: 
 
Xt =  + 1Xt-1 + t (Eq.1) 
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Where Xt is the first difference of variable X at time t;  is a constant; 1 is a regression 
coefficient; Xt-1  is the level of variable X at time t-1; t is the error term. The t value of 1 is 
nonstandard but takes an appropriate value in tables of the Dickey-Fuller test. The results of 
the Dickey-Fuller tests on all time-series variables are shown in Table 1. These illustrate that 
the variables can be considered to be stationary and therefore suitable for use in these 
regression analyses. 
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
  
The second problem is that analyses with time-series data can suffer from autocorrelation – a 
situation where the best predictor of the level of the dependent variable is that which occurs 
at the previous observation. To counter this problem all models include a lagged endogenous 
variable and the existence of any evidence of autocorrelation is examined by the use of the 
Durbin-Watson test. 
 
The final problem is that, for the market-based models, it is necessary to distinguish between 
periods of incumbency and opposition. If these data were cross-sectional, a common 
procedure to differentiate the effects of opposition and incumbency would be to simply 
divide the data by those criteria and compare regressions. However, the use of time-series 
presents a problem since splitting the data entails interrupting the time-series. In addition, in 
a time series such as this, with a relatively small number of observations, splitting the data 
can create an unacceptable reduction in the degrees of freedom. One solution to this problem 
is to employ an intercept dummy variable to denote incumbency or opposition, together with 
a dummy interaction variable. This is produced by multiplying the dummy variable by the 
relevant independent variable and captures differences in the slope (Gujarati, 1992, pp 260-
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78). By using these techniques, problems of interrupted time-series are avoided.
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 Thus, such 
models in these analyses take the following general form: 
 
Yt =  + 1Yt-1 + 2Dt + 3Xt + 4(Dt*Xt) + t (Eq.2) 
 
Where:  is a constant; Yt is the dependent variable; Yt-1 is the dependent variable lagged by 
one observation (to alleviate autocorrelation); Dt is the dummy intercept term (1=Incumbent 
and 0=Opposition); Xt is an independent variable; (Dt*Xt) is the interaction variable of Xt 
multiplied by Dt; t is the error term; 1-4 are regression coefficients. 
 
There is also one further methodological issue that arises from the particular kinds of 
aggregate data employed here. The analysis of objective economic data, particularly where 
observations are relatively infrequent (as they are here), can present problems of collinearity. 
That is a situation whereby independent variables are themselves strongly correlated. The 
existence of collinearity and multi-collinearity can lead to spurious regressions. As a means 
of avoiding such problems, the objective economic indicators analysed here were entered into 
a factor analysis. Before this was done however, there was a need to ensure that all variables 
were directionally similar – that is to say that a rise in the value of an individual variable 
generally indicated economic success, whilst a fall indicated under-performance. This 
presented a problem in terms of the three variables where a decline might be viewed as 
beneficial – bank rates, inflation and unemployment. In order to solve this problem, these 
three variables were indexed so that a rise in the level of those variables now indicated 
economic success. 
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Table 2 shows that the factor analysis produced three clear components. Factor 1 may be said 
to represent the domestic business economy. The component correlates most strongly with 
the bank rate, inflation and the terms of trade index. Factor 2 represents the domestic 
individual economy. It correlates most strongly with unemployment, inflation and growth. 
Factor 3 represents the international economy. This correlates most strongly with the balance 
of payments and the ratio of exports to imports. Factor scores from this analysis were then 
produced, tested for stationarity and used in subsequent regressions. 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
For all the tables that follow, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used. All models are run using 
party central income as the dependent variable.  Total income, rather than total donations is 
used since increases in income are not necessarily derived from direct voluntary payments, 
but also from such things as parties’ entrepreneurial activities. Such activities would be likely 
to be affected by the independent variables used here, but would not be classified as 
donations. All models also include an endogenous variable lagged by one year to alleviate the 
problem of autocorrelation. 
 
Results 
The Punishment-Reward Model 
This model employs interaction terms as illustrated in Equation 2. The results relevant to this 
model – the incumbent years – are reported in Table 3. In terms of Conservative income, the 
objective economy appears to have very little impact, Only one parameter – the international 
economy factor – is statistically significant. However, that parameter is negatively signed. 
This suggests that the worse the British international economy performs under Conservative 
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administrations, the greater the income to the Conservative Party. This is a counter-intuitive 
finding. As far as the other key variables are concerned, whilst the Domestic Individual 
Economy is correctly signed, the Domestic Business Economy is not, though, of course, 
neither attain statistical significance. Finally, the model fit is very poor. Under Labour 
governments, it is again only the Domestic Individual Economy that is correctly signed. 
However, as with the other two economic factors, it is not statistically significant. Overall, it 
would seem that the state of the economy has little discernible impact upon the financial 
success or otherwise of incumbent parties. 
 
[Table 3 About Here] 
 
The Expectation-Satisfaction Model 
The same form of model used for the Punishment-Reward models for incumbents is then run 
for periods of opposition. The results are reported in Table 4. In these models, the expectation 
is that the economic factors will be negatively signed – suggesting that economic under-
performance will benefit opposition parties. This is the case for the model examining Labour 
income whilst in opposition. None of these parameters are, however, statistically significant. 
For the Conservative Party, only the International Economy Factor is correctly signed. Both 
domestic factors are positively signed, suggesting that improvements in the domestic 
economy under Labour governments benefit the Conservative Party financially – a counter 
intuitive finding. Again however, none of these parameters attain statistical significance. 
Thus, as for incumbent parties, the state of the economy would appear to have little impact 
upon the financial success of the opposition party.  
 
[Table 4 About Here] 
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The Evaluation Model 
Doubts about the existence of a functioning market for party income continue when the 
results of the Evaluation model are examined in Table 5. Interaction techniques are again 
used. However, only the results of Conservative incumbent and Labour opposition years are 
reported as the individual evaluation time series only begins in 1974. The analyses for this 
model were run with all types of personal economic evaluations (prospective egocentric, 
prospective sociotropic, retrospective egocentric and retrospective sociotropic) as well as 
with various scales built from these indicators (prospective, retrospective, egocentric, 
sociotropic, all evaluations and a factor score from all four indicators). Only the results from 
the prospective sociotropic models are reported here as these produced the best model fit.  
 
For the Conservative Party, the individual economic evaluation is correctly signed and is 
statistically significant. Thus, when prospective sociotropic evaluations under Conservative 
governments improve, this is accompanied by a rise in Conservative income. However, what 
is also interesting is that a decline in the CBI Industrial Trends Survey is also associated with 
a rise in Conservative income. Although this parameter fails to attain statistical significance, 
the fact that it is not positively signed, or significant, questions one of the long-held reasons 
given for donations to the Conservative Party – that it is ‘the party of business’ (Fisher, 
1994b, pp 692-5). The CBI Industrial Trends Survey is a measure of business confidence and 
one would expect that rises in this indicator under Conservative administrations would be 
rewarded. This is not the case. 
 
For Labour, the CBI Survey is not included in the analysis reported here. This is because 
there is a far less likely link between business confidence and party income.
8
 Individual 
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economic evaluations are incorrectly signed – suggesting that increases in prospective 
sociotropic evaluations under Conservative governments benefit Labour income. The 
parameter is not however, statistically significant.  
 
Overall, it would appear that market-based models have very limited success in predicting 
levels of party income. Most results are either nonsignificant or counter-intuitive. Only in one 
area - individual economic evaluations - does there appear to be an effect consistent with the 
hypotheses. Thus, in economic terms at least, parties would appear to have little control over 
their finances. Their income rises and falls almost regardless of how well or how badly they 
perform. 
 
[Table 5 About Here] 
 
The Disposable Income Model 
The Disposable Income model offers an alternative hypothesis. It rejects the notion of a 
market and predicts that party income will be a function of greater overall wealth. Crucially, 
it is not a matter of concern which party has presided over rises and falls in these indicators. 
The results are reported in Table 6. This model appears to suggest that, for both parties, lower 
rates of inflation tend to benefit that party’s coffers. No other disposable income parameters 
have a statistically significant impact upon Conservative income, though is it worth noting 
that reductions in the rise in personal disposable income do appear to benefit the 
Conservatives, although of course this is nonsignificant. For Labour, not only does lower 
inflation benefit the party, but higher bank rates do as well. This appears to be counter-
intuitive although one might argue that savers would benefit from higher rates, and so this 
group may then contribute more funds to the party.  Notwithstanding that debate, it is clear 
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that lower inflation appears to benefit both parties’ incomes. Crucially however, this is the 
case regardless of which party has presided over periods of lower inflation. 
 
[Table 6 About Here] 
 
The Electoral Necessity Model 
The Electoral Necessity model seeks to measure what Figures 1 to 4 appear to suggest, 
namely that it is the timing of British general elections which most affects parties’ income. 
This hypothesis appears to be broadly borne out. For both parties, general election years have 
a strong and statistically significant effect. The importance of the general election cycle is 
further emphasised by the fact that pre-election years also have a positive impact, reflecting 
the fact that parties attempt to build up income in the expectation of general elections. Given 
that the United Kingdom has variable dates for its general elections, this partially reflects the 
uncertainty that at least opposition parties experience in trying to predict their timing. 
  
For the Conservatives, a larger margin between the poll ratings is also a factor affecting party 
income. This may be seen a being counter-intuitive, since we might expect greater 
marginality to increase income rather than vice versa. On the other hand, this may illustrate a 
bandwagon effect, which occurs when election victory is very likely. Certainly, this has been 
a trend identified in the past in the USA (Heard, 1960, p.69). This variable is also positively 
signed for Labour, though is not statistically significant. Finally, it is worth noting that, for 
both parties, the fit for this model is much more impressive than that for any of the other 
models analysed here – suggesting that the electoral necessity model is the best for 
explaining party income. 
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[Table 7 About Here] 
 
The results of these empirical tests suggest that it is electoral necessity that promotes 
variation of party income rather than it being a reflection of economic performance. Parties 
are better funded when there is low inflation and in the run up to general elections. The 
performance of parties (at least in economic terms) does not appear to affect their income to 
any significant degree. As a consequence, it may be argued that parties will have less control 
over variations in their income. No matter how well a party performs in government or 
opposition, their voluntary income is not affected. What matters, is when general elections 
are held. 
 
The implications arising from this are clear. Whilst funding appears to reflect the general 
election cycle, the needs of parties do not. Parties must function at both routine and 
campaigning levels throughout this cycle, yet income largely remains a function of one 
electoral cycle. This has two principal effects. For the Conservatives, it has led to continual 
overspending. Labour has resisted this trend, but for both parties the implication is that 
resources cannot be devoted to all functions to the degree that might be deemed desirable. 
Even in the area of campaigning, parties can clearly dedicate only a limited proportion of 
their resources to second-order (non-general) elections. Since levels of campaigning are 
positively correlated with turnout (Denver & Hands, 1997, 1998), this has potentially wider 
implications – particularly when turnout in second-order elections is becoming a source of 
concern. Beyond the importance of campaigning, income based upon the general election 
cycle leads to problems of parties fulfilling their other functions – two of which are political 
education and communication, which again are likely to be variables with the potential to 
affect electoral turnout. 
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Thus, if parties have little control over the levels of their voluntary income, at least in terms 
of performance, and if parties are possibly underfunded in terms of fulfilling their functions 
successfully, the case for enhanced levels of public provision become a little stronger. 
However, the Neill Committee did not explicitly support state funding. Beyond the measures 
outlined earlier in this article, the committee took the view that the time for comprehensive 
state funding had not yet arrived. The Report argued that the proposed national spending 
limits would curb parties’ need for ever-increasing resources and also cast doubt upon the 
arguments that parties were underfunded (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1998, 
p.92). There is merit in this view, but it is based on the assumption that campaigning is 
excessive and requires curbing. This is a debatable point since, by definition, campaigning 
raises the electorate’s political awareness and possibly the level of political education. At a 
time when there are concerns over political engagement, it might seem odd to curb this form 
of political communication. Moreover, if income is largely driven by the electoral cycle, it is 
unlikely that parties will be able to stockpile resources for non-election years, since that 
would entail donors contributing in the knowledge that election expenditure (which has 
stimulated contributions) is to be limited. Such limitations would logically be a disincentive 
to make a contribution. 
 
Yet, for all that, the Neill Report does go further than any previous enquiry in political 
finance and critically stands more chance of being implemented. Not only does it propose a 
limited increase in state funding, it also explicitly recognises that parties are essential to 
parliamentary democracy and that all of their functions require adequate financing. Moreover, 
the Report recommends that in order to guarantee fairness in referendum campaigns are fair, 
registered campaigns may apply for core public funding (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 
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1998, p.164). The implication here is that the market is insufficient to provide an even political 
contest - a principle that could theoretically be applied to elections. In short, the Report does not 
rule out comprehensive state funding in the future. 
 
Conclusions 
Underlying the notion of the voluntary basis of party funding is the principle that funds are 
provided voluntarily by supporters in response to continuing support for the party. Parties 
therefore succeed or fail financially depending upon whether they retain support. Models 1, 2 
and 3 (Punishment-Reward, Expectation-Satisfaction and Evaluation) test this assumption. If 
a market for party income exists in the same way that it could be said to do so for votes, then 
the empirical case for more comprehensive state funding would be weakened. Parties would, 
in theory, be able to enhance their level of income, either through good economic 
performance as incumbents, or by providing credible alternatives in opposition. The case 
against treating parties as competitors for income is examined by means of Models 4 and 5 
which test the extent to which a party’s income is dependent upon levels of personal 
disposable income under any administration and the timing of the principal election. If these 
models provide strong explanations for variation in party income, the empirical case for state 
funding is strengthened since parties effectively have little control over their finances in 
terms of their performance.  
 
All the models presented here could be employed to evaluate the effectiveness of any system 
of party finance that relies to a significant extent upon voluntary income. In the case of 
Britain, it is clear that electoral considerations, rather that economic performance, are the best 
predictor of party income and that, empirically at least, the case for more comprehensive 
public funding is stronger. In short, the assumption that parties may have control over their 
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income by virtue of their performance is seriously undermined. Thus the basis of voluntary 
income as an effective means of distributing funds to competing parties is seriously questioned. 
Parties require funds to operate on a constant basis, yet often struggle for resources and 
cannot entirely predict their own income, since they are not necessarily rewarded for success 
or punished for failure. It is difficult then to sustain any argument that parties must compete 
for income. As such, if we accept the case that healthy political parties are an important 
aspect of democratic life, then the case for providing more comprehensive public assistance 
becomes at least, a little stronger. 
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Figure 1
Conservative Central Income (Real Terms) 1959-94
Year (General Election)
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Figure 2
Labour Party Central Income (Real Terms) 1959-94
Year (General Election)
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Figure 3
Conservative Party Donations (Real Terms) 1959-94
Year (General Election)
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Figure 4
Non-Trade Union Affiliation Income to the Labour Party (%) 1959-94
Year (General Election)
928783797470666459
N
o
n
-T
U
 A
ff
il
ia
ti
o
n
 L
a
b
o
u
r 
In
co
m
e 
%
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
 33 
Figure 5
Conservative Party
Central Expenditure as a Percentage of Central Income 1959-94
Year
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Figure 6
Labour Party
Central Expenditure as a Percentage of Central Income 1959-94
Year
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Table 1 
 
Dickey-Fuller Tests  
 
Variable t 
value 
Level of  
Significan
ce 
Critical 
Value 
Bank Rate -1.938 * -1.61 
Balance of Payments -1.758 * -1.61 
CBI Industrial Trends Survey -4.435 *** -2.78 
Conservative Income -6.122 *** -2.78 
Export Import Ratio -2.557 ** -2.00 
Growth -4.352 *** -2.88 
Inflation -2.113 ** -2.06 
Labour Income -2.021 ** -2.00 
Marginality -3.377 *** -2.78 
% Change in Maximum Unemployment -5.598 *** -2.88 
% Change in Personal Disposable 
Income 
-4.586 *** -2.88 
Prospective Sociotropic Economic 
Evaluations 
-3.359 *** -3.08 
Terms of Trade Index -2.069 ** -2.00 
 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 2 
 
Factor Analysis of Objective Economic Indicators 
 
 Component 
 1 2 3 
Bank Rate 0.844   
Balance of Payments   0.941 
Export-Import Ratio   0.845 
Growth  0.867  
Inflation 0.755 0.443  
Maximum 
Unemployment 
 0.833  
Terms of Trade 0.858   
Eigenvalue 2.193 1.759 1.743 
% of Variance 
Explained 
31.3 25.1 24.9 
Dickey-Fuller Sig. * *** * 
n=35    
 
Note: Table contains varimax factor loadings which exceed 0.40 in value. Principal 
Components Analysis used with factors extracted with an eigenvalue >1. 
 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 3 
 
Punishment-Reward Model 
 
Period Conservative Incumbent Labour Incumbent 
Dependent Variable Conservative Income Labour Income 
 b t p b t p 
Constant 1333.173 4.165 *** 351.872 2.639 *** 
Conservative/Labour 
Income t-1 
-0.216 -1.098  0.574 3.401 *** 
Incumbency Dummy 42.557 0.207  -153.365 -1.311  
Domestic Business 
Economy 
-108.611 -0.227  -61.859 -0.926  
Domestic Individual 
Economy 
81.339 0.170  11.081 0.107  
International Economy -172.075 -0.359 * -76.185 -0.469  
Adjusted R
2
 0.010   0.565   
Durbin-Watson 1.984   2.338   
n=35       
 
 
 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 4 
 
Expectation-Satisfaction Model 
 
 
Period Conservative Opposition Labour Opposition 
Dependent Variable Conservative Income Labour Income 
 b t p b t p 
Constant 1375.730 5.910 *** 198.507 1.585  
Conservative/Labour 
Income t-1 
-0.216 -1.098  .574 3.401 *** 
Opposition Dummy -42.557 -0.207  153.365 1.311  
Domestic Business 
Economy 
176.787 1.476  -68.312 -0.955  
Domestic Individual 
Economy 
15.404 0.082  -23.349 -0.445  
International Economy -66.350 -0.216  -43.959 -0.795  
Adjusted R
2
 0.010   0.565   
Durbin-Watson 1.984   2.338   
n=35       
 
 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 5 
 
Evaluation Model 
 
 
Period Conservative Incumbent Labour Opposition 
Dependent Variable Conservative Income Labour Income 
 b t p b t p 
Constant 833.076 2.573 ** 333.089 1.826 * 
Conservative/Labour 
Income t-1 
0.023 0.101  0.462 2.131 ** 
Incumbency/Opposition 
Dummy 
627.597 1.937 * 275.668 1.349  
CBI Industrial Trends -4.858 -0.650  X X  
Prospective Sociotropic  25.623 1.826 * 6.747 1.075  
Adjusted R
2
 0.073   0.334   
Durbin-Watson 1.552   2.014   
n=21       
 
 
 
X Variable Not Included in Model 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 6 
 
The Disposable Income Model 
 
 
Dependent Variable Conservative Income Labour Income 
 b t p b t p 
Constant 1230.401 3.560 *** 102.100 0.655  
Conservative/Labour 
Income t-1 
-0.118 -0.696  0.629 4.727 *** 
Personal Disposable 
Income 
-19.213 -0.559  -16.959 -0.946  
Bank Rate 37.844 1.330  34.800 2.252 ** 
Inflation -46.743 -2.201 ** -22.290 -2.002 ** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.028   0.521   
Durbin-Watson 1.916   2.455   
n=35       
 
 
 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 7 
 
The Electoral Necessity Model 
 
 
Dependent Variable Conservative Income Labour Income 
 b t p b t p 
Constant 817.443 3.970 *** -19.587 -0.224  
Conservative/Labour 
Income t-1 
-0.092 -0.638  0.816 8.279 *** 
Marginality 21.591 1.838 * 3.459 0.645  
Election Year 652.138 3.723 *** 451.558 5.758 *** 
Pre-Election Year 348.330 2.003 ** 143.347 1.812 * 
Adjusted R
2
 0.268   0.730   
Durbin-Watson 1.878   1.989   
n=35       
 
 
 
 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Notes 
 
1. Part of this article was originally presented to the American Political Science Association 
Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996. I am grateful to the British Academy and London 
Guildhall University for funding this research. I am also grateful to Gerry Kennally 
(London Guildhall University) and to Harold Clarke (University of North Texas), who 
provided very useful methodological advice. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude 
to the four anonymous referees for their perceptive and helpful comments. 
  
2. The term 'Short' money refers to Financial Aid to Opposition Parties in the House of 
Commons.  It is named after Edward Short, Labour Leader in the House of Commons at 
the time of its introduction in 1975. In 1996/7, the Labour Party received £1,530,191 
under this scheme. 
 
3. The sources for all data in these and the following figures are: Conservative Party, Fisher 
(1996a, 1996b), Labour Party, Pinto-Duschinsky (1981,1985,1989) and Webb (1992). 
 
4. Routine expenditure is defined as year on year expenditure concerned with the 
maintenance of a party’s infrastructure and research. It does not include any expenditure 
on campaigning. 
 
5. Certainly, previous opinion polls upon the concept of state funding for political parties 
have yielded generally negative responses. (Fisher, 1995a: 69; Linton, 1994: 99) 
 
6. The sources of these data are: Annual Abstract of Statistics, Economic Trends, 
Conservative Party, Labour Party, Gallup, CBI, Butler & Butler (1994), Fisher 
(1996a;1996b), Pinto-Duschinsky (1981; 1985; 1989a) and Webb (1992). Since the data 
are taken as an annual observation, incumbency is defined by the party being in 
government for the greater proportion of the calendar year. Two of the variables represent 
percentage change from the previous year rather than the level form of those variables. 
These were included as there is a plausible theoretical link between improvements in 
those variables being significant. Thus, a percentage reduction in unemployment is still 
likely to have an impact upon levels of income whereas the level of unemployment may 
not. 
  
7. When interaction terms are used in regression analysis, problems of collinearity amongst 
independent variables sometimes arise. However, this was not the case in these analyses. 
 
8. The model was also run with the CBI Industrial Trends Survey included as a predictor of 
Labour income. It made no discernible difference to the results of the regression 
 
